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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a novel mathematical optimization framework for the identification of the 
vulnerabilities of electric power infrastructure systems (which is a paramount example of critical 
infrastructure) due to natural hazards. In this framework, the potential impacts of a specific natural 
hazard on an infrastructure are firstly evaluated, in terms of failure and recovery probabilities of system 
components; these are, then, fed into a bi-level attacker-defender interdiction model to determine the 
critical components whose failures lead to the largest system functionality loss. The proposed framework 
bridges the gap between the difficulties of accurately predicting the hazard information in classical 
probability-based analyses and the over-conservatism of the pure attacker-defender interdiction models. 
Mathematically, the proposed model configures a bi-level max-min mixed integer linear programming 
(MILP) that is challenging to solve. For its solution, the problem is casted into an equivalent one-level 
MILP that can be solved by efficient global solvers. The approach is applied to a case study concerning 
the vulnerability identification of the georeferenced RTS24 test system under simulated wind storms. 
The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework for identifying critical 
locations under multiple hazard events and, thus, for providing a useful tool to help decision-makers in 
making more-informed pre-hazard preparation decisions.  
KEY WORDS: vulnerability analysis; critical infrastructures; natural hazards; network interdiction; 
attacker-defender interdiction model; mathematical optimization 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern society relies on the effective functioning of critical infrastructure (CI) systems such as the 
power grid, transportation network, Internet, water distribution network, etc. to provide public services, 
improve quality of life, sustain private profits and spur economic growth. Recent years have seen many 
disruptions of CIs caused by natural disasters (i.e., floods, ice and wind storms, hurricanes, tsunamis 
and earthquakes) leading to a substantial impact on the human livelihoods and economic properties 
(Munich, Kron, & Schuck, 2014). Furthermore, there is a significant concern that the number and 
severity of these extreme natural events will increase in the future as a result of global warming and 
climate changes (Cutter et al., 2015). Hence, there is a need of techniques and tools to assess the impact 
of extreme natural events on CIs, in support policymakers and investments in system protection practices 
(Cadini, Agliardi, & Zio, 2017a, 2017b; Rocchetta, Li, & Zio, 2015). 
A key component of the protection of CIs against natural disasters for managing and mitigating 
service disruptions is the ability to evaluate potential vulnerabilities. Vulnerability analysis for CI 
systems has been given increased attention in the research community during the last decades. Different 
definitions and pre-analytic visions of vulnerability have been developed by diverse researchers and 
policy makers from different knowledge domains. As a result, the implementation of vulnerability 
analysis takes different forms (Johansson, Hassel, & Zio, 2013). For example, Haimes (2006) defines 
vulnerability as “the manifestation of the inherent states of the system that can be exploited to adversely 
affect that system”– stressing that vulnerability is concerned with the intrinsic characteristics of a system 
rather than the environment in which the system is located. Aven (2011) interprets vulnerability as the 
uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of the activity given the occurrence of the accident 
initiating event, which is scenario-specific. As a matter of fact, albeit vulnerability is often viewed as an 
inherent characteristic of a system, most researchers acknowledge that vulnerability is conditional on a 
hazard or that it is useless to discuss vulnerability independent of its hazard context (Birkmann, 2007). 
Overall, the concept of vulnerability has been continuously widened and broadened towards a more 
comprehensive vision, and interested readers can refer to some relevant discussions and overviews on 
this in the literature (Ezell, 2007; Füssel, 2007; Kröger & Zio, 2011; Murray & Grubesic, 2007; Scholz, 
Blumer, & Brand, 2012; Zio, 2016; Zio & Aven, 2011).  
In the context of the present paper, we follow previous studies (Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005; Ezell, 
2007) and view vulnerability as a measure of system susceptibility to scenarios for more narrowly 
identifying weak points in the system within the context of a scenario. Thus, vulnerability analysis is 
adopted from the perspective of critical components analysis that focuses on the identification of 
important components or combinations of components with regard to the impact on system functionality 
loss subject to a natural hazard (Jönsson, Johansson, & Johansson, 2008; Oh, Deshmukh, & Hastak, 
2012; Zio & Sansavini, 2011, 2013). In this paper, we carry out the vulnerability analysis in support to 
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short-term pre-event preparation practices, e.g. choosing critical power poles to be hardened or 
allocating backup power units in an electrical power system before a specific typhoon strikes the system. 
A range of approaches have been proposed in the literature for the vulnerability assessment of CI 
systems under natural hazards (Zio & Kroger, 2009). Sohn (2006) used an accessibility perspective to 
study the vulnerability of a highway network under flood damage by evaluating the significance of its 
links. Dawson, Peppe, and Wang (2011) proposed a multi-agent simulation method coupled with a 
hydrodynamic model to evaluate the vulnerability of individuals to flooding threats. Jenelius and 
Mattsson (2012) presented a grid-based approach to analyze the vulnerability of road networks under 
area-covering disruptions. The road network is covered using a grid of uniformly shaped and sized cells, 
where each cell represents the spatial extent of a disrupting event. Adachi and Ellingwood (2008) 
introduced a probability-based simulation method to study the seismic vulnerability of a municipal water 
system taking into account the supporting electrical power system. Na and Shinozuka (2009) applied a 
similar simulation-based method for the seismic loss estimation of seaport transportation systems. Hong, 
Ouyang, Peeta, He, and Yan (2015) proposed a comprehensive methodology to quantitatively assess the 
railway system vulnerability under floods using historical data and GIS technology. Other important 
investigations concerning the vulnerabilities of various CI systems under natural hazards include the 
seismic vulnerability analysis of the power grid and water pipeline system in Shelby County, USA 
(Hernandez-Fajardo & Dueñas-Osorio, 2011, 2013), and of the European gas and electricity systems 
(Poljanšek, Bono, & Gutiérrez, 2012), the vulnerability assessment of the power grid and gas network 
under wind storms (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio, 2014; Salman, Li, & Stewart, 2015; Winkler, Duenas-
Osorio, Stein, & Subramanian, 2010), the vulnerability of telecommunication systems to hurricanes 
(Kwasinski, 2010) and the lightning vulnerability of the power grid (Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009). 
The above vulnerability studies analyze different CI systems and different types of natural hazards, 
but generally entail a probability-based analysis framework, which includes the following steps: i) threat 
characterization by modeling the specific natural hazard, ii) estimation of failure probabilities of system 
components under the hazard scenario, iii) simulation of the damage state of each component, and iv) 
modeling and analysis of the system functional response given the component damages. This simulation-
based analysis framework is valuable for assessing system vulnerability in a statistical manner, i.e., 
computing the average system performance loss or identifying the critical components in the system, 
based on different realizations of a specific hazard. However, for a specific realization/estimation of a 
hazard event, the uncertainty within the estimated failure probabilities can be propagated by the 
simulation-based methods, leading to underestimation or overestimation of system vulnerability. 
Actually, it is extremely difficult to accurately predict the failure probabilities of each components in a 
CI system exposed to a natural hazard. Therefore, there is a strong need to develop more robust tools to 
assist decision makers during pre-hazard preparation (Pidgeon, 2012).  
4 
 
Optimization methods have been applied for the identification of weak locations vital to the 
operation of network systems. Interdiction models have been developed to assess the vulnerabilities of 
network systems based on the component importance to system functionality (Arroyo, 2010; Bier, Gratz, 
Haphuriwat, Magua, & Wierzbicki, 2007; G. Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron, & Wood, 2005; Church, 
Scaparra, & Middleton, 2004; Delgadillo, Arroyo, & Alguacil, 2010; Matisziw & Murray, 2009; 
Matisziw, Murray, & Grubesic, 2007; Ramirez-Marquez, 2010; Salmeron, Wood, & Baldick, 2004; 
Wood, 2011). In the classical problem of network interdiction, an intelligent attacker’s activities are 
modeled using the constructs of network optimization (e.g., maximum flows, multi-commodity flows, 
and shortest paths), and attacks target the network’s components to disrupt the network’s functionality 
to the maximum, resulting in a bi-level attacker-defender Stackelberg game in a mathematical form of 
“max-min” (or “min-max”) programming (Wood, 2011). Its extension to trilevel defender-attacker-
defender system defense models in supporting the allocation of limited protection resources have also 
been studied in CI protection planning (G. Brown, Carlyle, Salmerón, & Wood, 2006; Y.-P. Fang & Zio, 
2019; Y. Fang & Sansavini, 2017; Ouyang & Fang, 2017). By exploiting optimization, these interdiction 
models intend to establish bounds for network vulnerability in terms of critical components associated 
with worst-case impacts to system performance. In other words, these methods might overestimate the 
system performance loss during the vulnerability analysis of a CI system under a natural hazard, and the 
identified critical components may not necessarily be failed by the hazard. 
To overcome the drawbacks of the aforementioned methods, this paper presents a novel 
optimization-based mathematical framework for the identification of the vulnerabilities of electric 
power infrastructure systems (which is a paramount example of CI) under natural hazards by combining 
the interdiction models and the predicted information of specific natural hazards. In particular, the time-
varying failure probabilities of system components are firstly computed by integrating the spatial-
temporal profile of the natural hazard and the structural fragilities of the components. The restoration 
time of components is also estimated probabilistically. Then, the attacker-defender interdiction game is 
modeled as an optimization problem, which incorporates the probabilities of failure and restoration of 
the components, and identifies critical parts of the system. Therefore, the failure scenarios identified by 
the optimization represent the most-likely worst cases under the specific hazard. The proposed approach 
bridges the gap between the difficulties of accurately predicting the hazard information in the classical 
probability-based analyses and the over-conservativeness of the pure attack-defender interdiction 
models for CI vulnerabilities analysis under a specific natural hazard, thus, providing a useful tool to 
help decision-makers in making more-informed pre-hazard preparation decisions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the models for evaluating 
the impacts of natural hazards on CI systems, including threat characterization, structural fragility and 
component restoration time models. In Section 3, the detailed formulation of the optimization 
framework for the identification of CI vulnerabilities is proposed. Section 4 proposes the solution 
methodology for the proposed optimization model. Section 5 presents the numerical results by applying 
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the proposed framework to the georeferenced RTS24 power test system. Relevant discussion and 
concluding remarks are provided in Section 6. 
2. IMPACT OF NATURAL HAZARDS ON CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
Depending on the nature of the formation process, natural disasters can be divided into: geophysical 
(earthquake, volcano, and tsunami), meteorological (tropical storm, tornado, blizzard, ice storm, and 
drought), and hydrological (flood), biological (epidemics and insect pests), and extraterrestrial (meteor). 
The former three types are generally most destructive to CI systems. They include not just one single 
instantaneous impact, but multiple and even continuous impacts. For instance, the windstorms that 
affected China in 2005 caused more than 60 high-voltage power transmission towers to collapse, and 
the ice and snow storms that devastated a large area in South China lasted for hours (Xie & Zhu, 2011). 
Disasters can even last for days, like the hurricane Sandy (2012) in the United States, where many of 
the CIs were wiped out in most of the eastern US (especially the coastal Mid-Atlantic States). Moreover, 
hazard impacts often are difficult to characterize because a given natural hazard may initiate a number 
of different threats. For example, tropical storms can cause damages through wind, rain, storm surge 
and islanding flooding. The most significant characteristics for assessing the disaster impacts are speed, 
onset, availability of perceptual cues (such as wind, rain, or ground movement), intensity, scope and 
duration of impact (Lindell & Prater, 2003). Table I summarizes the basic characteristics of natural 
disasters (Guikema, Davidson, & Liu, 2006; Wang, Chen, Wang, & Baldick, 2016).  
Table I. Characteristics of natural disasters 
Disaster type Impact region Predictability Span/Area Affecting time 
Tropical storm 
hurricane 
Coastal regions 
24-72 hours, 
moderate to good 
Large (radius up 
to 1500km) 
Hours to days 
Tornado Inland plains 
0-2 hours, bad to 
moderate 
Small (radius up 
to 8km) 
Minutes to 
hours 
Blizzard, ice 
storm 
High latitude 
regions 
24-72 hours, 
moderate to good 
Large (up to 
1500 km) 
Hours to days 
Earthquake 
Regions on fault 
lines 
Seconds to 
minutes, bad 
Small to large 
Minutes to days 
(aftershock) 
Tsunami Coastal regions 
Minutes to hours, 
moderate 
Small to large 
Minutes to 
hours 
Drought, Wild 
fire 
Inland regions Days, good Medium to large Days to months 
Flooding 
Low-lying 
regions 
Moderate to good Small to large Days to months 
Physical impacts of natural disasters on CIs vary substantially across different hazard types and CI 
systems. The prediction and evaluation of the impacts are challenging tasks due to the presence of 
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uncertainty about the highly dynamic evolution of hazards, as well as the inherent complexity of large-
scale CI systems. In the remaining part of this section, we introduce how the impacts of a specific type 
of natural hazard, i.e., wind storms, on components of power systems can be analyzed through the 
combination of threat characterization, fragility models of system components and system restoration 
models. 
2.1 Threat Characterization 
The primary step to evaluate the impacts of a specific natural hazard on a CI system is to model the 
spatiotemporal profile of all the threats engendered from the hazard because CI systems cover extensive 
geographic scales (Kröger & Zio, 2011; Zio, 2016). Threat characterization models aim to associate the 
forecasted hazard parameters with the estimation of local threat intensity for each CI components.  
A wind storm (typhoon or hurricane) event is represented by its key information forecasted, e.g. 
landing time and positions, approaching angle, translational velocity, central pressure difference, 
maximum wind speed, radius of maximum wind, which can be obtained through climate models (CMs) 
and/or real measurement data (Davis et al., 2008). The majority of wind-storm-related power outages in 
power transmission happens because trees are blown onto power lines and poles, and/or high intense 
winds directly blow down poles during storms (Han, Guikema, & Quiring, 2009). Thus, the intensity of 
wind is regarded as the primary threat of storms. The wind speeds profile for a storm can be generated 
through parametric radial wind field models (Batke, Jocque, & Kelly, 2014; Davis et al., 2008; Holland, 
1980; Holland, Belanger, & Fritz, 2010). The wind speed at location (𝑥, 𝑦) at time 𝑡 can be represented 
by (Holland et al., 2010) 
𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑡) = 𝑣𝑚 {(
𝑅𝑚
𝑟
)
𝑏
𝑒
[1−(
𝑅𝑚
𝑟
)
𝑏
]
}
𝑎
 (1) 
where 𝑟 is the distance from the point to the storm center (𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡), 𝑦𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑡)), which moves in the 
translational velocity 𝑣𝑡 of the storm, 𝑣𝑚 is the maximum wind speed, 𝑅𝑚 is the radius of maximum 
wind (also called as wind radius) and can be calculated from the storm eye-diameter (ED) (Batke et al., 
2014), 𝑏 is the empirical Holland parameter and can be estimated based on the central pressure of the 
storm, and 𝑎 is a scaling parameter that adjusts the wind profile shape and a value of 𝑎 = 0.5 is typically 
used (Holland et al., 2010). Fig. 1 shows an example of wind profile of the Typhoon Meranti at 2016 
September 14, 18:00 (GMT+8) when making landfall at Xiamen, China, calculated by Eq. (1) based on 
the dataset from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States 
(NOAA, 2016). 
Structural damage is mostly related to peak gust wind speed, which is measured as the largest speed 
during a specified period (usually 3 seconds). A gust factor can be used to convert the surface wind 
speed calculated by Eq. (1) to the most likely peak gust speed. A gust model has been developed for 
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modeling gust factors (Vickery & Skerlj, 2005), and a justified empirical value of 1.287 can be used 
(Xu & Brown, 2008). 
 
Fig. 1.  Wind profile of the Typhoon Meranti at 2016 September 14, 18:00 (GMT+8) when making landfall at 
Xiamen, China 
Storm-induced flooding is not considered here as a major threat to power systems, though storm 
surges associated with landfalling wind storms can cause damages to underground power components 
and substations (R. Brown, 2009). Yet, detailed threat models of storm flooding considering local 
geospatial information exist in the literature (Aerts, Lin, Botzen, Emanuel, & de Moel, 2013; Lin, 
Emanuel, Oppenheimer, & Vanmarcke, 2012), and they can be included if relevant data are available. 
2.2 Structural Fragility Models 
The functionality state of each components within a CI system can be determined by the following 
three steps: i) identify the key (types of) components of the system, ii) modeling the fragility of 
components, and iii) failure probability assignment.  
In the first step, the types of components identified vulnerable to the threat, whose failures could 
possibly have a high impact on system performance, are identified. Although power systems comprise 
many types of components, it is practical to focus on the most important ones, e.g. substations and 
overhead lines (including the support structures and the conductors between structures). As a matter of 
fact, power outages due to storm-type events are most often a result of damage to overhead power lines 
caused by strong winds (Campbell, 2012). Therefore, in this study, we assume that generation and 
substation plants are not directly affected by the windstorm and consider only the failures of overhead 
lines, although generation nodes can be disconnected due to outages of transmission corridors. 
Fragility analysis is required to compute the probability of failure of components under certain levels 
of threat intensity. The concept of fragility curves originates from structural reliability analysis (Booker, 
Torres, Guikema, Sprintson, & Brumbelow, 2010; Espinoza, Panteli, Mancarella, & Rudnick, 2016; Y. 
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Li & Ellingwood, 2006), and, represents the conditional probability of failure of a structural element as 
a function of disaster strength parameters like wind speed and precipitation, as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Generic fragility curve  
The calculation of fragility curves is often based on parametric statistical models, taking into account 
factors like the designed strength and aging of the components. For different CI components, different 
fragility curves may be used as best fits to historical data. Regarding power systems, there is a range of 
literature discussing the structural fragility models subject to wind loading (Bjarnadottir, Li, & Stewart, 
2012; Fenton & Sutherland, 2011; Hangan, Savory, El Damatty, Galsworthy, & Miller, 2008; Salman 
et al., 2015; Savory, Parke, Zeinoddini, Toy, & Disney, 2001). The lognormal distribution is usually 
assumed to describe the fragility curves of support poles and overhead power lines (Bjarnadottir et al., 
2012; Salman et al., 2015), and the direct threat-induced failure probability 𝑝(𝑣(𝑡)) as a function of the 
wind speed 𝑣(𝑡) is given by the following lognormal cumulative distribution function (CDF)  
𝑝(𝑣(𝑡)) = Φ [
ln(𝑣(𝑡)/𝑚)
𝜎
] (2) 
where Φ(⋅) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, 𝑚 is the median of the fragility function, and 
𝜎 is the logarithmic standard deviation of the intensity measure. The values of the parameters 𝑚 and 𝜎 
are related with the structural characteristics of the component under consideration.  
In the third step, the overall failure probability of each component is computed by taking into account 
direct and indirect threats that could lead to failure. For example, besides failures caused by direct wind 
load, overhead power lines also fail due to falling trees and flying debris. Actually, around 55.2% of 
power outages in the U.S. Northeast regional distribution systems are caused by trees falling down 
during wind storms (G. Li et al., 2014). In addition, overhead lines consist of support poles, conductor 
wires and other types of equipment (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio, 2014). The collapse of a single pole or 
conductor results in the disconnection of the entire line. Therefore, the overall failure probability of an 
overhead line is modeled as a series system with the fragility analysis of each pole and conductor 
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associated with that line. It is assumed that the fragility of different components of an overhead line is 
independent. The overall failure probability of an overhead line 𝑙 under wind speed 𝑣(𝑡) is calculated 
as 
𝑝𝑙,𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑣(𝑡)) = 1 − ∏[1 − 𝑝𝑆𝑘(𝑣(𝑡))]
𝑚
𝑘=1
∏[1 − 𝑝𝐶𝑘(𝑣(𝑡))]
𝑛
𝑘=1
 (3) 
where 𝑚 is the number of poles supporting line 𝑙, 𝑛 is the number of conductor lines between two 
adjacent poles at line 𝑙, 𝑝𝑆𝑘  is the conditional failure probability of the 𝑘th pole at line 𝑙 which can be 
given by Eq. (2), and 𝑝𝐶𝑘 is defined as the failure probability of conductor 𝑘 between two poles. This 
probability can be modeled by (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio, 2014; Winkler et al., 2010): 
𝑝𝐶𝑘(𝑣(𝑡)) = max (𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤(𝑣(𝑡)), 𝜛𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤𝑡(𝑣(𝑡))) (4) 
where 𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤(𝑣(𝑡))  is the direct wind-induced failure probability of conductor 𝑘 ; 𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤𝑡(𝑣(𝑡)) 
represents the fallen tree-induced failure probability of conductor 𝑘; and 𝜛 is the average tree-induced 
failure probability of overhead conductors, reflecting the efforts of trimming trees of utilities and 
assumed constant (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio, 2014). The direct wind-induced failure probability 
𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤(𝑣(𝑡)) can be computed by Eq. (2), based on the structure property parameters of the conductor 
(Bayliss, Bayliss, & Hardy, 2012). The fallen tree-induced failure probability 𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤𝑡(𝑣(𝑡)) can be 
calculated approximately as (Canham, Papaik, & Latty, 2001) 
log (
𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤𝑡(𝑣(𝑡))
1 − 𝑝𝐶𝑘,𝑤𝑡(𝑣(𝑡))
) = 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑐𝑠(𝑘𝑧𝑆𝑘)𝐷𝐻
𝑏𝑠 (5) 
where 𝑎𝑠, 𝑏𝑠, and 𝑐𝑠 are parameters related with tree species, 𝑆𝑘 the wind intensity (0-1 scale) at the 
conductor, and 𝐷𝐻 the tree diameter at breast height. The parameter 𝑆𝑘 can be calculated by dividing the 
local peak gust wind speed by the maximum wind speed in the affected area (Canham et al., 2001). 
2.3 Component Restoration Time Model 
A range of models have been proposed in the literature for the post-disaster restoration processes of 
various CI systems (Duffey & Ha, 2013; Guikema, Quiring, & Han, 2010; Liu, Davidson, & 
Apanasovich, 2007; Nateghi, Guikema, & Quiring, 2011). The output of these models is usually 
represented by restoration curves at the system level (percentage of customers with service versus time) 
or by system average interruption duration indices (SAIDI). Yet, for system criticality analyses aiming 
at supporting pre-event decision making, models for estimating the restoration times of components are 
required. The response to the disaster and the restoration time of failed CI components varies directly 
with: (i) storm categories, (ii) locations and types of damaged components, and (iii) the amount of repair 
crews and material resources available. Thus, the restoration time of a failed component can be 
expressed by 
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𝑇 = 𝑓(𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦, 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠). (6) 
In practice it is usually challenging to have an analytic form of 𝑓(⋅). Instead, probabilistic models 
like Gaussian (Ouyang & Dueñas-Osorio, 2014) and exponential distributions (Espinoza et al., 2016; 
Zapata, Silva, Gonzalez, Burbano, & Hernandez, 2008) are traditionally used to represent the repair 
processes of power system components. Zapata et al. (2008) studied realistic historical data and showed 
that the lognormal distribution is a more appropriate model for component repair times in power systems. 
On the other hand, storm categories and intensities significantly affect the repair times of the damaged 
components, e.g., more time is needed for the repair crews to approach safely the affected areas under 
severe weather conditions. This effect can be modeled as an increase in the Mean Time To Repair 
(𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅) of components by a factor of restoration stress (RS). For example, Espinoza et al. (2016) 
assumed random RS values in the range {2, 4} for overhead lines restoration under moderate storms. In 
practice, data about RS can be obtained or estimated from past repair experience under different storm 
categories (Bhuiyan & Allan, 1994). 
Therefore, for a given storm category, the probability that a failed component, e.g., an overhead line 
𝑙, is repaired within time 𝑇 is given by (Zapata et al., 2008) 
𝑝𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝜏 ≤ 𝑇|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) = Φ {
ln[𝑇/(𝑅𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔 ∙ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑙)]
𝜎
} (7) 
where 𝑅𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔  represents the restoration stress under storm category 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔 , 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑙  is the 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅  of 
overhead line 𝑙 under normal operation, and 𝜎 is the logarithmic standard deviation of restoration time.  
3. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE OPTIMIZATION 
MODEL 
For conducting the system vulnerability analysis, the failure probabilities of the CI components 
obtained from the hazard model and component fragility models can be fed to simulation-based models, 
e.g., the Sequential Monte Carlo-based time-series simulation (Espinoza et al., 2016; Kadri, Birregah, 
& Châtelet, 2014; Lindell & Prater, 2003). However, the uncertainty of the estimated failure 
probabilities can be propagated by simulation-based methods and lead to underestimation or 
overestimation of system vulnerability, especially for a specific realization of hazard event. On the other 
hand, the vulnerabilities of CI can be identified by a worst-case interdiction analysis, i.e., by an attacker-
defender bi-level programming model (Arroyo, 2010; G. Brown et al., 2005; Y. Fang & Sansavini, 2017; 
Salmeron et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the pure attacker-defender approach does not take into account the 
predicted information of specific natural hazards, as well as the spatiotemporal correlations of the natural 
hazards which strongly impact the probability of some common cause failures. Therefore, the pure 
attacker-defender approach can be misleading for the hardening of a system against specific natural 
disasters. 
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In this section, we propose a bi-level optimization model for identifying the vulnerabilities of a CI 
system under a specific hazard. The notations used in the model are given as follows: 
Indices, sets and parameters 
𝑖 Index used for buses (nodes) 
𝑙 Index used for transmission lines 
𝑉 Set of buses 
𝑉𝐺 Set of generators 
𝑉𝐷 Set of demand nodes 
𝐿 Set of transmission lines 
𝕋 Set of discrete times of hazards 
𝕌 Uncertainty set of system component failures 
𝕆(𝒖) Feasible set of system operation under a realization of an uncertainty scenario 𝒖 ∈ 𝕌 
?̃?(𝒖, 𝒐) System functionality loss under hazards 
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximal repair time of system components 
𝑋𝑙 Reactance of transmission line 𝑙  
𝑂(𝑙) Origin or sending node of line 𝑙 
𝑅(𝑙) Destination or receiving node of line 𝑙 
𝐺𝑖
𝐺 Capacity of generator 𝑖 
𝐹𝑙
𝐿 Capacity of line 𝑙 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷 Total demand at node 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 Maximum allowable limit for 𝜃𝑖𝑡 variables 
𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐷 Load shedding cost at node 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
Γ Budget of failure uncertainty 
Υ Budget of recovery uncertainty 
Decision variables 
𝑦𝑙𝑡 Binary variables indicating whether an overhead line 𝑙 is damaged to be offline (𝑦𝑙𝑡 = 1) 
or not (𝑦𝑙𝑡 = 0) at time 𝑡 
𝑟𝑙𝑡 Binary variables indicating whether an overhead line 𝑙 is restored to be online (𝑟𝑙𝑡 = 1) 
or not (𝑟𝑙𝑡 = 0) within time 𝑡 
𝑥𝑙𝑡 Binary variables indicating whether an overhead line 𝑙 is online (operational, 𝑥𝑙𝑡 = 1) or 
not (𝑥𝑙𝑡 = 0) at time 𝑡 
𝜃𝑖𝑡 Phase angle in node 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝑓𝑙𝑡 Power flow in line 𝑙 at time 𝑡 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 Power output at generator node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝐺 at time 𝑡 
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 Load shedding in node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝐷 
The proposed bi-level interdiction optimization is formulated as follows: 
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max
𝒖∈𝕌
min
𝒐∈𝕆(𝒖)
?̃?(𝒖, 𝒐) (8) 
where 
?̃?(𝒖, 𝒐) = ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐷∆𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝑉𝐷𝑡∈𝕋
 (9) 
is the objective function representing the total system performance loss during a natural hazard event, 
where the variable 𝒖 represents the time-dependent failure states of the transmission lines affected by 
the event; the variable 𝒐 indicates the feasible system operation vector; 𝕌 and 𝕆 are the uncertainty set 
of transmission line failures and the feasible set of system operations, respectively. The objective 
function is calculated by the cumulative load shedding costs across all the demand nodes 𝑉𝐷 in the 
system and over the entire event duration 𝕋. The first level problem in (8) aims to identify the most 
critical failure pattern of transmission lines 𝒖 so that the system performance loss ?̃?(𝒖, 𝒐) is maximized. 
The vector variable 𝒖 includes information about which transmission lines are failed, and the associated 
failure and recovery times, which are modeled by the time-dependent indicator variables 𝒙, 𝒚 and 𝒓, i.e., 
𝒖 = [𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒓]. The second level problem is to minimize the system performance loss ?̃?(𝒖, 𝒐) due to the 
physical damage of transmission lines in the second level via feasible system operations, i.e. re-
dispatching of the power flows. 
The uncertainty set 𝕌 of component failures under a hazard is modeled as follows:  
       𝕌 = {𝒖 |∑(− log2 𝑝𝑙𝑡)𝑦𝑙𝑡
𝑙∈𝐿
≤ Γ , ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
∑ 𝑦𝑙𝑡
𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 
∑[− log2 𝓅̅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔)]𝑟𝑙𝑡
𝑙∈𝐿
≤ Υ, ∀𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥} 
∑ 𝑟𝑙𝑡
𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡=1
≤ 1, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 
𝑥𝑙𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑙𝑡
𝑡
𝑡−∑ 𝑡∙𝑟𝑙𝑡𝑡
= 1, 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
𝑥𝑙𝑡 , 𝑦𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑙𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋} 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
where 𝒖 = [𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒓] indicates the failure states of the overhead lines in the system over the whole time 
horizon of the hazard. Constraint (10) defines the uncertainty budget of system failure. Inspired by 
Shannon’s information theory ("7th AIMMS–MOPTA Optimization Modeling Competition," 2015; 
Shannon, 2001), this definition relates the failure probabilities 𝒑 of the system components and their 
binary damage variables 𝒚 at each time period. The parameter Γ represents the total uncertainty budget 
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of system failure, and can be assigned by the analyst. As a matter of fact, the notion of uncertainty 
budget is widely used in robust optimization for allowing the decision maker to control the conservatism 
of the robust optimization formulation, which is inherently max-min (i.e., worst-case) (Ben-Tal, El 
Ghaoui, & Nemirovski, 2009; Bertsimas, Brown, & Caramanis, 2011). Generally, a large value of 
uncertainty budget represents a low level of risk that the decision maker is willing to take, i.e., the 
decision maker is conservative. By this approach, we provide the decision maker with a knob to adjust 
for her/his risk attitude. In the constraint (10), the failure probability 𝑝𝑙𝑡 is calculated by Eq. (3). The 
constraint (10) states that the failure of a “reliable” line, i.e., having smaller failure probability 𝑝𝑙𝑡, is 
more “surprising”, i.e., takes up more failure uncertainty budget than the failure of a vulnerable line that 
has a larger failure probability 𝑝𝑙𝑡. For instance, if the failure probability of a line 𝑝𝑙𝑡 = 0, then the 
occurrence of its failure takes an infinite large failure uncertainty budget and 𝑦𝑙𝑡 will be 0, if Γ is not 
infinite. Conversely, if the failure probability 𝑝𝑙𝑡 = 1, then the occurrence of its failure takes zero budget, 
and 𝑦𝑙𝑡 will be 1 in the optimization. Therefore, given a vector 𝒑 of the failure probability of the system 
components, a large Γ implies a large system failure budget and thus a large upper limit of the number 
of failed lines. In other words, by setting a larger Γ the decision maker is willing to take a lower level of 
risk (i.e., assuming a larger quantity of “bad luck”) and, thus, obtains a larger set of worst-case failed 
lines (that he/she presumably wants to protect). Constraint (11) states that an overhead line can only fail 
once during the horizon of a hazard. Similar to constraint (10), constraint (12) bounds the uncertainty 
budget Υ for the component recovery times. A large value of Υ represents a high degree of uncertainty 
with regard to the restoration times of the failed lines. In other words, the decision maker expects a large 
quantity of “bad luck” and allows the failed lines to be restored with more “surprising” periods of time, 
e.g., longer periods of time with smaller probabilities. In (12), 𝓅̅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) represents the 
normalized probability that a failed line 𝑙  is recovered within time duration 𝑡(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥)  under a 
specific category of storm, and is calculated as follows: 
𝓅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) = 𝑝𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) − 𝑝𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡 − 1|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) (16) 
𝓅̅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) =
𝓅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔)
max
𝑡∈{1,…,𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥}
𝓅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔)
 (17) 
where 𝑝𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) is obtained by Eq. (7). The normalized probability is used here to ensure that 
the problem is still feasible when the uncertainty budget Υ takes the value of 0. Specifically, it is noted 
that 𝓅̅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔) always takes the value of 1 for the time period with the largest probability, i.e., 
for 𝑡∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔max 𝓅𝑙,𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑡|𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔); then, the recovery duration of a failed line 𝑙  will be 𝑡
∗  in the 
optimization for Υ = 0. In practice, the values assigned to the parameter Υ can, for instance, reflect the 
decision maker’s own attitude towards restoration uncertainty; the connection between risk preference 
and the budget of uncertainty set has been studied in depth in (Bertsimas et al., 2011; Bertsimas & Thiele, 
2006). Constraint (13) indicates that a failed line is repaired only once during a hazard. Constraint (14) 
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imposes that a line is either functional, i.e., 𝑥𝑙𝑡 = 1, or failed and not being repaired, i.e., ∑ 𝑦𝑙𝑡
𝑡
𝑡−∑ 𝑡∙𝑟𝑙𝑡𝑡
=
1, where ∑ 𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑙𝑡𝑡  gives the repair time of the line. Constraint (15) imposes the integrity conditions for 
the variables 𝒙, 𝒚 and 𝒓. 
In the second level of (8), the feasible set of system operations under a realization of an uncertainty 
scenario 𝒖 ∈ 𝕌 for power grids is formulated by the DC power flow (Y. Fang & Sansavini, 2017; 
Ouyang & Fang, 2017) as follows: 
𝕆(𝒖) = {𝒐 |𝑋𝑙𝑓𝑙𝑡 − [𝜃𝑂(𝑙)𝑡 − 𝜃𝑅(𝑙)𝑡] ≤
𝛼𝑙𝑡
𝑀1(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡), ∀𝑙, 𝑡 
 𝑋𝑙𝑓𝑙𝑡 − [𝜃𝑂(𝑙)𝑡 − 𝜃𝑅(𝑙)𝑡] ≥
𝛽𝑙𝑡
− 𝑀1(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡), ∀𝑙, 𝑡 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷 =
𝛾𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑡
𝑙∈𝐿|𝑅(𝑙)=𝑖
− ∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑡
𝑙∈𝐿|𝑂(𝑙)=𝑖
+ ∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 , ∀𝑖, 𝑡 
0 ≤ 𝑔𝑖𝑡 ≤
𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝑖
𝐺 , ∀𝑖, 𝑡 
0 ≤ ∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤
𝜁𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷 , ∀𝑖, 𝑡 
−𝑥𝑙𝑡𝐹𝑙
𝐿 ≤
𝜂𝑙𝑡
𝑓𝑙𝑡 ≤
𝜌𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑙𝑡𝐹𝑙
𝐿, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 
−𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤
𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝜃𝑖𝑡 ≤
𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥, ∀𝑖, 𝑡 
𝜃𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑓
=
𝜗𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑓
0, ∀𝑡} 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
where constraints (18)-(19) represent the power flow for every line, where 𝑀 is a sufficiently large 
positive constraint (i.e., 𝑀 ≥ 2𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 ). Constraint (20) enforces the power balance for each bus. 
Constraint (21) limits the capacities of generation units. Also, constraint (22) bounds the maximum 
value of unserved electricity demand for each bus. Constraint (23) sets the limits of power flow on each 
lines. Finally, constraint (24) bounds phase angles and constraint (25) sets the phase angle of the 
reference bus to zero. The feasible operation of the system is represented by continuous variables 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 , 𝑓𝑙𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝜃𝑖𝑡 and 𝜃𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑓
. In (18)-(25), we denote the dual variables associated with each constraints 
that will be used in Section (4). 
4. SOLUTION METHOD  
The proposed max-min formulation (8)-(25) of Section 3 configures a bi-level mix-integer linear 
programming (MILP) problem. The solution method presented in this section casts the problem into an 
equivalent one-level MILP. For a given upper level decision vector 𝒖, the lower-level system operation 
problem 
min
𝒐∈𝕆(𝒖)
?̃?(𝒐) where 𝕆(𝒖) is subject to (18)-(25) (26) 
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is a pure linear programming (LP) problem, hereinafter referred to as the primal of the lower-level 
problem (or simply primal problem). 
Proposition 1: For every given upper-level decision vector 𝒖 = [𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒓] and for bounded 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐷, the 
primal of the lower-level problem (26) has a finite optimum. 
Proof: It suffices to show that the problem (26) is neither unbounded nor infeasible for any given 
upper level decision vector [𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒓]. Note that all decision variables in (26), i.e., 𝒈, 𝒇, ∆𝑷, 𝜽 and 𝜽𝒓𝒆𝒇, 
have finite lower and upper bounds, which is consistent with the physical requirements of power system 
operation. Moreover, [𝒈, 𝒇, 𝜽, 𝜽𝒓𝒆𝒇] = 0 and ∆𝑷 = 𝑷𝑫 is always a feasible solution to the problem, for 
any values of [𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒓].                                                                                                                            ∎ 
The dual problem of the lower-level primal problem is given as follows: 
max
𝓭∈𝔻(𝒖)
∑ {∑[𝐹𝑙
𝐿𝑥𝑙𝑡(𝜌𝑙𝑡 − 𝜂𝑙𝑡) + 𝑀1(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡)(𝛼𝑙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑡)]
𝑙∈𝐿𝑡∈𝕋
+ ∑[𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷(𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡) + 𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝛿𝑖𝑡]
𝑖∈𝑉
} 
Subject to 
𝔻(𝒖) = {𝓭 |𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 ≤
𝑔𝑖𝑡
0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡 ≤
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐷 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
𝑋𝑙𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝑋𝑙𝛽𝑙𝑡 + 𝛾𝑅(𝑙)𝑡 − 𝛾𝑂(𝑙)𝑡 + 𝜌𝑙𝑡 + 𝜂𝑙𝑡 =
𝑓𝑙𝑡
0, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
∑ (𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑡)
(𝑙 ∈ 𝐿|𝑅(𝑙) = 𝑖)
− ∑ (𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑡)
(𝑙 ∈ 𝐿|𝑂(𝑙) = 𝑖)
+ 𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 =
𝜃𝑖𝑡
0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉\𝑟𝑒𝑓, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
∑ (𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑡)
(𝑙 ∈ 𝐿|𝑅(𝑙) = 𝑖)
− ∑ (𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑡)
(𝑙 ∈ 𝐿|𝑂(𝑙) = 𝑖)
+ 𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡
𝑖 =
𝜃𝑡
𝑖
0, for 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑒𝑓, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
𝛼𝑙𝑡 ≤ 0, 𝛽𝑙𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝜂𝑙𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝜌𝑙𝑡 ≤ 0, ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 
𝛿𝑖𝑡 ≤ 0, 𝜁𝑖𝑡 ≤ 0, 𝜆𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ≤ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋} 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
where 𝓭 represents the vector of dual variables and its feasible space 𝔻(𝒖) is given by (28)-(34), in 
which the primal variables that each dual constraints correspond to are defined. 
Regarding the optimality of the lower-level primal problem (26) and its dual problem (27)-(34), the 
following property exists: 
Proposition 2: For a given upper-level decision vector 𝒖 = [𝒙, 𝒚, 𝒓], suppose [𝒈, 𝒇, ∆𝑷, 𝜽, 𝜽𝒓𝒆𝒇] is a 
feasible solution to the lower-level primal problem (26) and [𝜶, 𝜷, 𝜸, 𝜼, 𝝆, 𝜹, 𝜻, 𝝀, 𝝁, 𝝑𝒓𝒆𝒇] is a feasible 
solution to problem (27)-(34). Then, [𝒈, 𝒇, ∆𝑷, 𝜽, 𝜽𝒓𝒆𝒇]  is an optimal solution to (26), and 
[𝜶, 𝜷, 𝜸, 𝜼, 𝝆, 𝜹,𝜻, 𝝀, 𝝁, 𝝑𝒓𝒆𝒇] is an optimal solution to (27)-(34), if and only if 
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∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝐷∆𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝑉𝐷𝑡∈𝕋
= ∑ {∑[𝐹𝑙
𝐿𝑥𝑙𝑡(𝜌𝑙𝑡 − 𝜂𝑙𝑡) + 𝑀1(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡)(𝛼𝑙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑡)]
𝑙∈𝐿𝑡∈𝕋
+ ∑[𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷(𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡) + 𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝛿𝑖𝑡]
𝑖∈𝑉
}. 
(35) 
Proof: A proof can be easily completed by evoking Proposition 1 together with the LP strong duality 
theorem which is a necessary condition of Proposition 2 and a direct consequence of the weak duality 
theorem which is a sufficient condition of Proposition 2.                                                                     ∎ 
Therefore, based on Proposition 2, the bi-level problem (8)-(25) can be transformed into the 
following single-level maximization problem by considering the dual of the inner-level problem:  
max
𝒖∈𝕌,𝓭∈𝔻(𝒖)
∑ {∑[𝐹𝑙
𝐿𝑥𝑙𝑡(𝜌𝑙𝑡 − 𝜂𝑙𝑡) + 𝑀1(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡)(𝛼𝑙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑡)]
𝑙∈𝐿𝑡∈𝕋
+ ∑[𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷(𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡) + 𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝛿𝑖𝑡]
𝑖∈𝑉
} 
subject to 
(10)-(15) and (28)-(34) 
(36) 
The bilinear terms in the objective function of (36), i.e., 𝑥𝑙𝑡(𝜌𝑙𝑡 − 𝜂𝑙𝑡) and (1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡)(𝛼𝑙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑡), can 
be linearized using linearization schemes that have been previously reported in the MILP literature (e.g., 
see Y. Fang and Sansavini (2017) and Ouyang and Fang (2017)). Specifically, we replace 𝑥𝑙𝑡𝜌𝑙𝑡 and 
𝑥𝑙𝑡𝜂𝑙𝑡 with ?̃?𝑙𝑡 and ?̃?𝑙𝑡, respectively, and introduce the following four additional constraints: 
𝜌𝑙𝑡 ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 0, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (37) 
−𝑀2𝑥𝑙𝑡 ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝜌𝑙𝑡 + 𝑀2(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡), ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (38) 
0 ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝜂𝑙𝑡, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (39) 
𝜂𝑙𝑡 − 𝑀2(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡) ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝑀2𝑥𝑙𝑡, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (40) 
where 𝑀2  is a sufficiently large number. Likewise, we replace the bilinear terms (1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡)𝛼𝑙𝑡  and 
(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡)𝛽𝑙𝑡 with ?̃?𝑙𝑡 and ?̃?𝑙𝑡, respectively, and introduce four additional constraints: 
𝛼𝑙𝑡 ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 0, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (41) 
−𝑀2(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡) ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝑀2𝑥𝑙𝑡, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (42) 
0 ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑙𝑡, ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (43) 
𝛽𝑙𝑡 − 𝑀2𝑥𝑙𝑡 ≤ ?̃?𝑙𝑡 ≤ 𝑀2(1 − 𝑥𝑙𝑡), ∀𝑙, 𝑡 (44) 
Consequently, the single level problem (36) is recast into an equivalent MILP, summarized as 
follows: 
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max
𝒖∈𝕌,𝓭∈𝔻(𝒖)
∑ {∑[𝐹𝑙
𝐿(?̃?𝑙𝑡 − ?̃?𝑙𝑡) + 𝑀1(?̃?𝑙𝑡 − ?̃?𝑙𝑡)]
𝑙∈𝐿𝑡∈𝕋
+ ∑[𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐷(𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜇𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡) + 𝐺𝑖
𝐺𝛿𝑖𝑡]
𝑖∈𝑉
} 
subject to 
(10)-(15), (28)-(34) and (37)-(44). 
(45) 
This resulting MILP problem is solved by global optimization solvers such as CPLEX (IBM, 2015). 
5. CASE STUDY 
5.1 Data Set  
To illustrate the proposed vulnerability analysis approach, the IEEE 24-bus one area reliability test 
system (named as RTS24) is considered (Grigg et al., 1999). To embed the system into a specific 
territory, the line lengths and geographical locations are chosen following Mohanpurkar, Sogbi, and 
Suryanarayanan (2015). Bus 7 of the test system is taken as a reference node and is located near Xiamen 
(24.5 N, 118.0E), a coastal city in China. The system is georeferenced by projecting it onto a 
400×400km2 study area located in the South of China, as illustrated in Fig. 3. There are 24 nodes (buses) 
and 38 transmission lines (circuits). The georeferenced coordinates of all nodes are given in Table II. 
In the present study, we use analytical fragility curves for power towers and transmission lines 
(between two supporting towers) adapted from Panteli, Pickering, Wilkinson, Dawson, and Mancarella 
(2016) (the “base” cases shown in Fig. 1 of Panteli et al. (2016)), which are based on the European codes. 
The parameters setting of 𝑤critical and 𝑤collapse are the same as those in Panteli et al. (2016). The fallen 
tree-induced failure probability of conductors is not considered for simplicity. However, this can be 
easily incorporated when the related data are available. As for the level of damage for towers and 
transmission lines, binary states are considered, i.e., a component is either completely out of service or 
fully operational, and the likelihood of complete failure is modeled using the analytical fragility curves.  
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Fig. 3.  The georeferenced RTS24 test system and one realization of a Catg-1 storm track. 
Table II. Geographical coordinates of power system buses 
Node ID Longitude Latitude Node ID Longitude Latitude Node ID Longitude Latitude 
1 116.288E 24.507N 9 116.770E 25.366N 17 115.236E 27.003N 
2 117.104E 24.507N 10 117.340E 25.357N 18 115.531E 27.420N 
3 115.492E 25.375N 11 116.701E 25.791N 19 116.485E 26.723N 
4 116.416E 25.067N 12 117.350E 25.791N 20 117.203E 26.723N 
5 117.035E 24.878N 13 118.147E 26.262N 21 116.534E 27.311N 
6 118.156E 25.203N 14 116.445E 26.271N 22 117.212E 26.985N 
7 117.960E 24.507N 15 115.501E 26.162N 23 117.812E 26.823N 
8 118.147E 24.805N 16 115.472E 26.578N 24 115.501E 25.782N 
 
5.2 Wind Storm Simulation 
For illustration purposes, the storms hit at the location with latitude 24.50N and longitude 118.30E 
(near Xiamen). The storms are assumed to be moving with a translational speed of 25km/h and traveling 
towards northwest (135°) (Dorst, 2017). Fig. 3 illustrates one realization of the forecasted track of the 
storms. The red plus signs represent the locations of the storm eye at different times, with one hour time 
steps. The yellow circle indicates the boundary of the maximum winds for the traveling storms at the 
landfall point. The area between the yellow circle 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥  and the dashed yellow circle 2𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 
experiences around 82.5% of the maximum wind speed. 
In order to assess the wind storm impact on the different elements of the RTS24 system, its dynamic 
wind field is modelled through Eq. (1), from which we can calculate the time-varying wind speeds at 
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each location within the power system. We consider three moderate-to-extreme wind storms, i.e. 
category-1, category-2 and category-3 with their maximal wind speed 𝑉𝑚=38 m/s, 46 m/s and 54 m/s, 
respectively. Fig. 4 shows the surface wind gust speed variations at node 7 within the test system as the 
storms of the studied three categories travel along their tracks. 
 
Fig. 4.  Hourly wind gust profiles at node no.7 under different categories of wind storms. 
For the recovery time of the failed transmission lines, we assume 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑙 = 10 hrs and 𝜎 = 1 for 
overhead lines (Espinoza et al., 2016; Zapata et al., 2008). As storm intensity increases, the repair crews 
need more time to approach the affected area and restore the damaged components, therefore, the 
restoration stress is assumed to be 𝑅𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔 = 1, 2, and 3 for category-1, category-2 and category-3 wind 
storms, respectively. Due to the lack of historical restoration data for the IEEE test system, the 
distribution parameters are assumed based on the related literature. The development of probabilistic 
restoration models for power system components based on historical data is of practical interest. Yet, 
regardless of the developed probabilistic model, the probability values of the restoration times of the 
failed components can be incorporated into the proposed optimization framework via the constraints 
(10)-(15). This entails no additional burden to the proposed vulnerability analysis framework, whose 
development is the focus of the present work. 
5.3 Results 
Based on the above wind storm simulation and the geographic and structural fragility data of the test 
system, the failure probability of transmission lines can be calculated using Eqs. (2)-(4). The recovery 
probability of failed lines are calculated by Eq. (7), where the data for the MTTR and RS parameters of 
the transmission lines are based on Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2014) and Espinoza et al. (2016). The 
proposed optimization problem for component criticality analysis is converted into its equivalent MILP 
problem following Section 4. The resulting MILP problem is implemented and solved in the IBM 
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CPLEX 12.6 optimization studio (IBM, 2015). All calculations are performed on a laptop with 2.6-GHz 
CPU and 8GB RAM. 
 
Fig. 5.  Optimized worst case load shedding (system performance loss ?̃?) under different failure uncertainty Γ at 
Υ = 0.1.  
Fig. 5 shows the optimized worst-case system performance loss ?̃? in terms of load shedding under 
different budgets of failure uncertainty Γ when Υ = 0.1, for the three categories of storms. It can be seen 
that a severe storm generally results in large system load shedding for each Γ because the large wind 
speeds increase the failure probabilities of the system components. Fig. 6 shows the time-dependent 
failure probabilities of all the 38 transmission lines in the RTS24 system under a) category-1, b) 
category-2 and c) category-3 storms, respectively. The failure probability of transmission lines is not 
likely to exceed 0.8 for the category-1 storm as shown in Fig. 6(a), whereas the number of lines whose 
failure probabilities exceed 0.9 increases largely for the category-2 storm in Fig. 6(b) and especially for 
the category-3 storm in Fig. 6(c). 
21 
 
 
Fig. 6. Time-dependent failure probabilities of the transmission lines in the test system under (a) category-1, (b) 
category-2 and (c) category-3 storms. 
Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows that the performance loss increases as the failure uncertainty budget Γ 
increases, for all the three storm severities. This is because a bigger value of Γ represents a larger upper 
limit of the number of failed lines, and indicates that the decision maker is more tolerant to loss of system 
performance. Therefore, the decision maker obtains a larger set of worst-case failed line by setting a 
large Γ. This can be further shown in Table III where the set of worst-case failed lines (Column 2) 
attained by the optimization for different values of Γ and their corresponding load shedding (Column 3) 
for the category-1 storm are listed. For instance, when Γ = 0.14 the optimized worst-case failed lines 
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are Line 8-9, Line 11-13 and Line 17-22, resulting in a total amount of 136.6MWh load shedding. It is 
important that the different sets of worst-case failed lines offer decision makers the flexibility to choose 
the appropriate critical lines to be protected. Moreover, Table III shows that the optimum set of the 
worst-case failed lines at small values of Γ is not necessarily a subset of the lines to be failed at large 
values of Γ. For example, Line 8-9 is failed in the optimized worst-case when Γ = 0.14 (row 3) and 0.22 
(row 4), but it is replaced by Line 2-6 and Line 3-9 when Γ = 0.23 (row 5) and 0.32 (row 6); Line 17-
22 is identified critical in rows 2-7 but not in rows 8-9.  
Table III. Optimized worst-case failed lines and load shedding (LS) for the Catg-1 storm at Υ = 0.1 
Γ Worst-case failed lines LS (MWh) 
0.07 17-22 130.1 
0.14 8-9, 11-13, 17-22 136.6 
0.22 8-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 427.2 
0.23 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22  446.0 
0.32 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 478.4 
0.35 2-6, 3-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 590.3 
0.36 2-6, 3-9, 8-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-23, 16-19, 17-22 1849.2 
0.37 2-6, 3-9, 8-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 16-19 3978.7 
0.38 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 8-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 16-19 4522.7 
 
Unlike the static network interdiction problems (Wood, 2011) in which the failure of a set of lines 
results in a fixed system performance loss, in the proposed model the failures of lines are time-dependent 
due to the spatiotemporal dynamic of natural hazards. Thus, the failures of a same set of lines may lead 
to different amounts of load shedding if their failures times are different, as we can observe in the rows 
5 and 6 of Table III. For better illustration, Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) show the detailed failure and recovery 
times of each failed lines for the cases of Γ = 0.23 (row 5 in Table III) and Γ = 0.32 (row 6 in Table 
III), respectively. The failure and restoration times of Line 3-9 and Line 17-22 differ in the two cases, 
i.e., the former fails at the beginning of period 𝑡 = 10 and is repaired at the end of 𝑡 = 17 for Γ = 0.23, 
whereas it fails at 𝑡 = 8 and is repaired at 𝑡 = 15 for Γ = 0.32; the non-functional period of the latter 
starts from 𝑡 = 18 to 𝑡 = 25 for Γ = 0.23, but it starts from 𝑡 = 17 to 𝑡 = 24 for Γ = 0.32. This leads 
to a difference in the system load shedding of up to 32.4MWh for the two cases. In practice, the possible 
failure times of lines might be used to inform the decision maker of his/her preparation time allowance. 
Thus, the time allowance obtained by setting a larger value of failure uncertainty budget Γ, i.e., by 
allowing more “surprising” event to happen, is more robust for the preparation practice.  
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Fig. 7. Failure and restoration times of the worst-case failed lines for the Catg-1 storm at Υ = 0.1 for (a) Γ =
0.23 and (b) Γ = 0.32 
Table IV and Table V report the optimized worst-case failed lines and load shedding for the category-
2 and category-3 storms, respectively. For larger storms, smaller values of failure uncertainty budget Γ 
should be taken to obtain the same number of worst-case failed lines to that of smaller storms. This is 
due to the fact that more severe storms cause higher failure probabilities of overhead lines, as shown in 
Fig. 6; thus, less uncertainty budget is taken up by individual lines. Furthermore, the comparison of the 
optimized results in Table III, Table IV and Table V for the three categories of storms shows that 
stronger storms generally result in larger amounts of load shedding when a same set of lines are failed. 
For example, the performance loss for the category-1, category-2 and category-3 storms, is 478.4MWh, 
614.4MWh and 809.3MWh, respectively, when the same set of lines, i.e., Lines 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23 
and 17-22, fails (rows 6 in Table III, Table IV and Table V). This is not unexpected since it often takes 
longer times to be restored for lines damaged in stronger storms, as represented in Eq. (7). Furthermore, 
Table III, Table IV and Table V show that very similar results regarding the worst-case failed lines are 
obtained for the three storms. This is probably because the three storms are assumed to have exactly the 
same landfall point and traveling direction, thus being characterized by a similar wind field though with 
different degrees of strength. 
Discovering the worst-case failed system components and load shedding for a specific upcoming 
storm has important practical considerations for forecasting system damage and advising defensive 
actions. We see from Table III, Table IV and Table V that large values of the failure uncertainty budget 
Γ correspond to large sets of worst-case failed transmission lines and usually large monetary costs for 
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their protection. Based on these Tables, the decision makers can, therefore, select the sets of most critical 
lines to be hardened that are in line with their investment budget. 
Table IV. Optimized worst-case failed lines and load shedding for the Catg-2 storm at Υ = 0.1 
Γ Worst-case failed lines LS (MWh) 
0.001 17-22 162.6 
0.002 11-13, 17-22 172.4 
0.005 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 533.2 
0.010 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22  586.7 
0.020 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 614.4 
0.021 2-6, 3-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-23, 16-19, 17-22 2240.6 
0.022 2-6, 3-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 16-19 5247.5 
0.023 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 8-9, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 16-19, 17-22 5848.7 
0.024 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 8-9, 8-10, 9-12, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 16-19 6209.6 
 
Table V. Optimized worst-case failed lines and load shedding for the Catg-3 storm at Υ = 0.1 
Γ(10−4) Worst-case failed lines LS (MWh) 
0.10 8-9, 11-13 0 
0.30 11-13, 12-23 618.9 
0.35 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23 708.3 
0.50 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 791.4 
1.00 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 809.3 
4.50 2-6, 3-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 16-19 3824.1 
4.60 2-6, 3-9, 8-9, 9-12, 10-11, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 16-19 3842.0 
4.80 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 16-19 6960.8 
4.90 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 8-9, 9-12, 10-11, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-16, 15-21, 16-19 6974.6 
 
Finally, we consider multiple landfall points and directions of different category-1 storms and find 
the solutions for each storm. We consider 5 different storm scenarios around the test system as shown 
in Fig. 8. The optimized solutions regarding the worst-case failed lines and the corresponding load 
shedding are shown in Table VI. For each scenario, three different values of failure uncertainty budget 
are considered. Table VI shows that the optimized critical lines are quite different in the storms with 
various trajectories, although there is some overlapping of the worst-case failed lines, e.g., Line 17-22 
in scenarios 1, 2 and 5. No single line is identified critical in all the five storms. These results indicate 
that the landfall locations and directions of storms do affect the uncertain set of system component 
failures. This is due to the fact that the considered test system spans a quite large scale of geographical 
space and the impact of a storm on the system components is site-dependent. This contradicts the 
assumptions made in previous studies where the wind speed at the central point of a system is applied 
uniformly to all components of the system (Salman et al., 2015). 
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Fig. 8. Tracks of different wind storms with different landfall points and traveling directions 
Table VI. Optimized worst-case failed lines and load shedding for different scenarios of category-1 storms where 
“NO” means no failure lines 
Scenarios Γ Worst-case failed lines LS (MWh) Computation time (s) 
Storm 1 
0.08 17-22 130.1 0.4 
0.23 2-6, 3-9, 11-13, 12-23, 17-22  446.0 172 
0.38 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 8-9, 9-12, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 14-
16, 16-19 
4522.7 1380 
Storm 2 
0.08 17-22 130.1 0.8 
0.23 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 408.0 29 
0.38 8-9, 8-10, 11-13, 12-13, 12-23, 17-22, 21-22 1771.8 820 
Storm 3 
0.08 NO 0 0.5 
0.23 2-6, 3-9, 8-9 22.4 56 
0.38 1-3, 2-4, 2-6, 3-9, 8-9, 8-10,  737.0 221 
Storm 4 
0.08 NO 0 0.8 
0.23 NO 0 0.7 
0.38 1-3, 3-9 350.0 4 
Storm 5 
0.08 17-22 130.1 5 
0.23 11-13, 12-23, 17-22 390.3 61 
0.38 1-5, 2-6, 3-9, 6-10, 11-3, 12-13, 12-23, 17-22 2188.0 1045 
 
The last column of Table VI reports the computational times required for solving the corresponding 
MILP models. It is shown that the total computational time increases rapidly as the failure uncertainty 
budget Γ increases. Indeed, a large value of Γ represents a big failure uncertainty set 𝕌, i.e., a large 
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searching space for the optimization problem. However, small values of Γ result in small sets of critical 
lines (candidates for protection) and are, therefore, probably more interesting to system managers who 
have to face limited investment budgets.  
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Physical models for evaluating the impact of natural hazards on infrastructure networks are affected 
by many uncertainties, including the intensity model of the natural hazard, the components structural 
fragility model and the probabilistic model of the restoration time of the failed components. These 
uncertainties can lead to the unreliable identification of system vulnerabilities. On the other hand, basic 
attacker-defender interdiction models based on the worst-case analysis can lead to an excessively 
conservative vulnerability analysis for CI systems subject to natural hazards. This paper presents a novel 
optimization-based framework for the identification of CI vulnerabilities under natural hazards; system 
vulnerability is interpreted from the perspective of critical components analysis and focuses on the 
identification of important components (or combinations of components), whose failures have a large 
impact on system functionality. In this framework, the estimated probabilities of components failure and 
restoration under specific natural hazards are integrated into a bi-level attacker-defender game 
interdiction model. This approach bridges the gap between the difficulties of accurately predicting the 
failure probabilities of system components in the simulation-based models and the over-conservatism 
of the basic attacker-defender approaches for CI vulnerabilities analysis under natural hazards. 
Therefore, it provides a valuable way to help decision-makers in making informed pre-hazard hardening 
planning decisions.  
By formulating the parameterized uncertainty set 𝕌 of the component failure states subject to the 
hazard, we are able to control the conservatism of the optimization solution via the uncertainty budgets 
Γ and Υ. For example, a larger value of the failure uncertainty budget Γ represents that the decision 
maker is more conservative (i.e., assuming a larger quantity of “bad luck”) and the failure of a “reliable” 
line, i.e., having smaller failure probability 𝑝𝑙𝑡, is even increasingly allowed. In other words, the decision 
maker may select a large Γ if he/she believes that component failure probabilities are affected by large 
uncertainties. This approach allows the decision maker a level of flexibility in setting the tradeoff 
between robustness and performance. 
Mathematically, the proposed model configures a bi-level max-min MILP, which is challenging to 
be solved directly. By leveraging the properties of the lower level LP problem, the model is transformed 
into an equivalent one-level MILP problem and, then, solved by an efficient global solver, i.e., CPLEX. 
The application to a case study involving the georeferenced RTS24 test system under simulated wind 
storms demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach for the identification of CI 
vulnerabilities due to a specific hazard event. These identified critical locations, which are conditional 
on the specific hazard, can be provided to the decision maker for use in supporting short-term pre-event 
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preparation practices, e.g. choosing critical power poles to be hardened or allocating backup power units 
in a power grid, before a specific wind storm strikes the system. By setting different values of the failure 
uncertainty budget Γ, the decision maker can select the sets of the most critical components to be 
hardened, which are compatible with the investment budget. 
The present study considers binary states of system components, i.e., completely out of service and 
fully operational, which is a modeling approach widely adopted in literature (Arroyo, 2010; G. Brown 
et al., 2005; G. Brown et al., 2006; Y. Fang & Sansavini, 2017; Ouyang & Fang, 2017; Salmeron et al., 
2004; Wood, 2011). However, it may be also interesting to consider multiple states of damage, e.g., a 
damaged overhead line is operational but with a reduced capacity. Moreover, due to the interconnected 
and dynamic nature of modern power systems, small disturbances may trigger long chains of knock-on 
component failures that can lead to massive power outages, i.e., the so-called cascading failures. The 
modeling of these is still a challenging problem, because of the many different mechanisms involved 
and the limited data available from historical cascade events (Y.-P. Fang, Pedroni, & Zio, 2015; B. Li, 
Barker, & Sansavini, 2017; Zio, 2016): for this reason they have not been taken into account in the 
present study and will be considered in future works. 
Power systems operations are also affected by many uncertainties, e.g., the capacity of renewable 
power generators and the power demand. One possible way to take into account these uncertainties is to 
construct another uncertainty set of the related system parameters 𝕌∗ in the same max-min optimization 
framework as the present study. Then, the optimization for the worst case scenario, i.e., for the worst 
case values of both the uncertain system parameters 𝕌∗ and the uncertain component failure states 𝕌, 
can be carried out within the first level problem in (8). This new problem can be solved by the same 
idea of Section 4, i.e., transforming it into a single-level maximization problem by considering the dual 
of the inner-level problem. 
Finally, the exponential increase in computational time with the size of the problem is a common 
feature of branch-and-cut algorithms when addressing MIP problems (Y. Fang & Sansavini, 2017; 
Ouyang & Fang, 2017). Although current commercial companies routinely solve MIP problems 
involving millions of variables and hundreds of thousands of constraints, more sophisticated techniques 
might also be required to ensure the applicability of the proposed restoration planning problem to large-
scale power systems with thousands of nodes and lines. To this aim, the study of efficient solution 
methodologies for two-stage robust optimization is an active field of research in mathematical 
optimization (Bertsimas et al., 2011). Promising solution methods, such as the column-and-constraint 
decomposition (Zeng & Zhao, 2013), can be applied to the proposed problem in our future study. 
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